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ABSTRACT 
The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant demonstrated the vulnerability of 
the plants on the loss of electrical power for several days, so called extended station blackout 
(SBO). A set of measures have been proposed and implemented in response of the accident at the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The purpose of the study was to investigate the 
application of the deterministic safety analysis for core heatup prevention strategy of the extended 
SBO in pressurized water reactor, lasting 72 h. The prevention strategy selected was water injection 
into steam generators using turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TD-AFW) or portable water 
injection pump. 
Method for assessment of the necessary pump injection flowrate is developed and presented. 
The necessary injection flowrate to the steam generators is determined from the calculated 
cumulative water mass injected by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump in the analysed 
scenarios, when desired normal level is maintained automatically. The developed method allows 
assessment of the necessary injection flowrates of pump, TD-AFW or portable, for different plant 
configurations and number of flowrate changes. 
The RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch04 computer code and input model of a two-loop pressurized 
water reactor is used for analyses, assuming different injection start times, flowrates and reactor 
coolant system losses. Three different reactor coolant system (RCS) coolant loss pathways, with 
corresponding leakage rate, can be expected in the pressurized water reactor (PWR) during the 
extended SBO: normal system leakage, reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and RCS coolant loss 
through letdown relief valve unless automatically isolated or until isolation is procedurally directed. 
Depressurization of RCS was also considered. In total, six types of RCS coolant loss scenarios were 
considered. Two cases were defined regarding the operation of the emergency diesel generators. 
Different delays of the pump injection start following the station blackout were assumed and 
analysed. For each scenario, two kinds of SBO calculations for two-loop PWR were performed, 
base and verification. Base calculations were needed to determine necessary minimum flowrate for 
steam generators feeding in such a way that they are not overfilled or emptied. Namely, it was 
assumed that instrumentation is not available during extended SBO. The verification calculations 
have been then performed to verify if the determined minimum flowrates are sufficient to prevent 
the core heatup. 
The calculated results show effectiveness of the proposed extended SBO prevention strategy 
provided that the water injection is available in the first two hours after SBO occurring at full 
power. If diesel generator is running after loss of offsite power for some time, e.g. one hour, the 
available time for steam generator water injection is significantly longer. The obtained results 
demonstrate the need for assessment of the pump injection flowrates before the utilization of the 
pump for mitigation of the event. The applicability of the developed method for assessment of the 
required pump injection flowrate has been validated on PWR. 
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The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant [1] and stress tests [2] showed that 
the loss of electrical power (LOOP) followed by station blackout event (SBO) and loss of the 
ultimate heat sink (UHS) can have large impact on the safety of the nuclear power plant (NPP). The 
SBO event when power from all emergency power sources, including batteries, is lost is named 
extended SBO and leads ultimately to core heatup and core damage [3]. After Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident the strategies were proposed for coping with such events. They include utilization of 
portable equipment, permanent equipment or combinations of portable and permanent equipment. 
Severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) have been also updated [5]. In the United States 
of America (USA) the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) [4] have been developed 
which are focused on maintaining or restoring key plant safety functions. Further, in FLEX 
guidelines [4] it is stated that while FLEX strategies are focused on the prevention of fuel damage, 
these strategies would be available to support accident mitigation efforts following fuel damage. 
However, coordination of the FLEX equipment with Severe Accident Management Guidelines 
(SAMGs) is not within the scope of the guideline. 
For the LOOP, SBO and the loss of the UHS scenarios, cooling of the core can be established 
by means of water injection to reactor coolant system (RCS) and/or steam generators (SGs). For 
RCS injection the source of borated water is needed. On the other hand, for SG makep sustained 
source of water is needed. Different systems for performing this function have been identified in the 
stress test reports, including electric power-independent turbine driven pumps, arrangements for 
gravity feed, dedicated diesel driven pumps and pre-installed connections for external feed, such as 
from the on-site fire trucks [6].  
The FLEX strategies also suggest development of thermal hydraulic analyses to support plant 
specific decision-making. Therefore in this paper utilization of the pump, either turbine driven 
auxiliary feedwater or portable pump, for mitigation of the extended SBO event and prevention of 
core damage in pressurized water reactor (PWR) is investigated. It presents a follow-up study to 
stress tests [7]. Methodology is developed for assessment of the necessary fix/portable pump 
flowrates within analysed time period. It should be noted that the FLEX strategy to inject water into 
steam generator [4] suggests that in certain circumstances, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system 
operation may be extended by throttling flow to a constant rate, rather than by stroking valves in 
open-shut cycles. Further, the assessed flowrates should also prevent the core damage without 
overfilling the steam generators in the analysed scenarios. 
The paper is organised as follows. The description of the deterministic safety analysis input 
model, the methodology used for the assessment of the necessary injection flow of the pump to SGs 
and developed case scenarios is given in Section 2, while in Section 3 the obtained results from the 
deterministic safety analyses are given. 
 
2 METHODS DESCRIPTION 
For calculations the RELAP/MOD3.3 Patch 04 thermal-hydraulic computer has been 
used [8]. The RELAP5 input model of NPP with two-loop PWR, described in details in refs. [7] and 
[9] is briefly described first. The method for calculation of necessary pump flowrate during 
extended SBO event is described. Finally, the scenarios are described. 
 
2.1 RELAP5 Input Model 
The noding scheme of PWR, used in the study, is shown in Figure 1. It was created using 
Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package (SNAP) [10]. The base plant model consists of 469 control 
volumes, 497 junctions and 378 heat structures with 2107 radial mesh points. However, since in 
SNAP the pipes are represented as one component (not by volumes) and since heat structures 
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connected to pipe volumes are represented as one heat structure, the number of SNAP hydraulic 
components is 304 and the number of heat structures is 108. The connection point for the portable 
pump is the same as for turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. 
 
 
Figure 1: Noding scheme of two-loop PWR represented by SNAP 
 
2.2 Method for Necessary Flowrate Determination 
Base calculations of extended SBO with assuming available TD-AFW pump and steam 
generator level control are needed to determine the necessary minimum flowrate for steam 
generators feeding in such a way that they are not overfilled or emptied. The later verification 
calculations are performed to verify if the determined minimum flowrates are sufficient to prevent 
the core heatup. The method for necessary flowrate consists of the following steps: 
- Step 1: From the base calculation for given scenario with given boundary conditions the 
integral of necessary water mass to be injected into steam generators is obtained to restore 
and maintain the desired water level. The analysis and evaluation of the cumulative water 
mass is done for time a window equal to the operational time of the pump during extended 
SBO. The scenarios that in the analysed time window result in the core heatup and 
damage need not to be considered in verification calculations. 
- Step 2: From cumulative water mass the necessary mass flowrate of the pump for steam 
generators makeup has to be set so, that the integral water mass injected in the steam 
generators at a given time ideally corresponds to the mass, determined in step 1, but in any 
case remains in the operable range of the steam generators (between 8% and 96%). In the 
simplest case the necessary mass flowrate is set constant for a longer time period. Care 
should be taken that the mass flowrate is high enough because of the initial period, in 
which the residual power is higher than in later times. It may turn out that for longer time 
periods this may not be achieved with a constant mass flowrate (i.e. the constant flow to 
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be too small in initial period) and that more adjustments of the mass flowrate are required 
as we progress with time. 
- Step 3: The verification calculations are performed with the determined necessary 
flowrate in the Step 2. These calculations verify if injected water into the SGs, for given 
scenario, prevents core heat up and SGs overfill. 
2.3 Scenarios description 
Different scenario types have been investigated to demonstrate proposed method for 
necessary flow, including plant design improvements which may be done to better cope with 
extended SBO. During extended SBO three different RCS coolant loss pathways, with 
corresponding leakage rate, can be expected in the PWR: (a) normal system leakage, (b) RCPs seal 
leakage, and (c) RCS coolant loss through letdown relief valve unless automatically isolated or until 
isolation is procedurally directed. Normal system leakage is assumed to be equal to plant technical 
specifications identified leakage (0.63 l/s at nominal RCS conditions) for selected PWR. The seal 
leak rate of 1.32 l/s per RCP (at nominal RCS conditions) due to loss of seal cooling and RCP pump 
stop is assumed as representative for the plants using a high temperature O-ring RCP seal package 
[11]. The seal leakage can be practically prevented (negligible loss of the order of 0.06 l/s) with the 
installation of special passive RCP thermal shutdown seals [12]. At nominal RCS pressure the 
letdown loss of 5.68 l/s is expected and this value was assumed in the study. 
To limit the RCS loss and enable passive accumulator injection the RCS depressurization 
(through the depressurization of the secondary side) scenarios have been also investigated. 
The main assumptions considered in the model for verification calculations are the following: 
- A1) Loss of all electric power in the plant, including batteries, what results in loss of active 
safety systems depending on AC power and loss of all instrumentation and control in the plant. 
- A2) The pump, TD-AFW or portable (through available connection point), is available for 
the whole analysed period for injection of water in the steam generators. The portable pump flow 
measurement and regulation is also assumed to be available in the study. The TD-AFW pump speed 
is manually controlled. Hand wheels are provided for local manual operation of TD-AFW control 
valves. The TD-AFW pump flowrate local indicators, not relying on electric power, are also 
available locally. 
- A3) Availability of water for operation of the water pump is assumed in the model. 
- A4) Pressurizer and steam generator safety valves are assumed available. 
- A5) The nitrogen gas required for the operation of the steam generator power operated relief 
valves (SG PORVs) is assumed available in the RCS depressurization scenarios. The alternative 
compressed air supply from the portable diesel compressor is providing required gas. 
- A6) The criterion used as indication for the steam generator overfill is 96% of wide range 
(WR) steam generator level, while for the loss of heat sink is 8%. 
- A7) The criterion used for core heatup is significant core uncovery causing core heatup start. 
In base calculations it was in addition assumed the operable TD-AFW with all 
instrumentation and control. The regulation of the TD-AFW was set to restore and maintain narrow 
range level at 69% (plant normal level, at normal power condition this means 77% wide range 
level). Using such assumptions the integrated mass injected to steam generators is obtained, which 
satisfy A6 criterion that SGs are not overfilled.  
Six types of RCS coolant loss scenarios, given in Table 1, have been developed and analysed: 
the NO_LOSS (no RCS loss), N_LOSS with normal system leakage, the S_LOSS with RCP seal 
loss starting one hour after the start of extended SBO, the SL_LOSS with RCP seal loss and loss of 
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coolant through the letdown relief valve when RCS pressure is greater than 4.24 MPa, SLD_LOSS 
with RCP seal and letdown loss (if RCS pressure is greater than 4.24 MPa) and depressurization of 
the primary side through the secondary side to 1.57 MPa, started 30 minutes after SBO occurrence, 
and NSLD_LOSS (SLD_LOSS case with additionally assumed normal system leakage). 
Table 1 Types of RCS Coolant Loss Scenarios 
Scenario type Normal system 
leakage 
Seal loss Letdown loss Depressurization 
NO_LOSS no no no no 
N_LOSS yes no no no 
S_LOSS no yes no no 
SL_LOSS no yes yes no 
SLD_LOSS no yes yes yes 
NSLD_LOSS yes yes yes yes 
 
For each type of loss scenarios given in Table 1 two cases were simulated: 
(1) In the Case 1 (C1) it is assumed that the emergency diesel generators (EDG) started and 
normally operated for one hour after the loss of offsite power. Availability of all safety systems is 
assumed during that hour. After one hour the extended SBO is assumed. It was similar in 
Fukushima Dai-ichi event when the EDGs were running for 45 minutes until tsunami arrived. 
(2) In Case 2 (C2) it is assumed that the extended SBO occurrence is concurrent with LOOP, 
resulting in large decay heat in the initial period. This is more severe as larger time delays of SBO 
start (i.e. delays of EDG loss) would mean smaller decay heat levels at the time of SBO occurrence 
(i.e. less heat to be removed from the core). 
Different time delays between the extended SBO start and start of the pump injections to 
steam generators have been considered and analysed in base calculations. In the Case 1 delays 0, 
0.5 h, 1 h, 2 h, 3 h, 4 h and 5 h (42 scenarios in total) and in the Case 2 delays 0, 0.5 h, 1 h, 2 h and 
3 h were considered (30 scenarios in total). The scenario name is compouned from scenario type 
name and the delay time (e.g. NO_LOSS type scenario with 4 hour delay of steam generator 
feeding is labelled as NO_LOSS_4). The no delay scenarios have been analysed for base 
calculations to verify if for selected scenario type the core heatup could be prevented by proposed 
strategy with SGs makeup. 
The calculations have been performed for 72 h, consisting of two time intervals for injections. 
The first time interval is 24 h reduced for pump start delay. The second time interval lasts from 24 h 
to 72 h. In the simplest case, the flowrate in the interval is constant. 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 Base Calculations 
The obtained necessary flowrates obtained from base calculations using method described in 
Section 2.2 are shown in Table 2. The first row in Table 2 specifies the RCS coolant loss scenario 
type defined in Section Error! Reference source not found.. The first column contains the delay 
time, in hours, of the pump start following the extended SBO. The pump constant flows in the first 
time interval (from pump start until 24 h), in kg/s, are given in the remaining columns for Case 1 
and Case 2 scenarios. The largest minimum necessary flows are obtained for SLD_LOSS type 
scenarios and the smallest for S_LOSS type scenarios. For the second time interval starting 24 h 
after SBO start and lasting 48 h the constant mass flow of 3 kg/s was assumed. Finally, Table 2 
shows that core heatup and damage is calculated for some of the analysed scenarios. 
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Table 2: Minimum Necessary Constant Flowrates in First Time Interval (from Pump Start until 24 h 
after SBO Start) 
Scenario 
type NO_LOSS N_LOSS S_LOSS SL_LOSS SLD_LOSS NSLD_LOSS 
Case 1, EDG running 1 h 
Delay (h) Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* 
0 4.79 4.77 4.68 N.A. 5.51 5.50 
0.5 4.90 4.87 4.78 N.A. 5.63 5.62 
1 4.99 4.98 4.88 N.A. 5.75 5.74 
2 5.22 5.20 5.11 N.A. 6.00 5.99 
3 5.47 5.45 5.34 N.A. 6.25 6.25 
4 5.63 5.62 5.51 N.A. 6.48 6.47 
5 N.A. N.A N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Case 2, EDG not running 
Delay (h) Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* Flow (kg/s)* 
0 5.50 5.46 5.38 N.A. 6.21 6.19 
0.5 5.60 5.58 5.49 N.A. 6.34 6.33 
1 5.72 5.70 5.61 N.A. 6.46 6.45 
2 5.86 5.83 5.72 N.A. 6.54 6.57 
3 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
* - N.A. because the core heatup occurs due to the core uncovery before 24 h 
For all SL_LOSS scenarios, as shown on Figure 2(a1) and Figure 2(a2), core uncover (results 
until calculation was aborted) before 24 h. Obtained results are expected considering large letdown 
loss of RCS coolant, causing core uncovery as shown on Figure 2(a1) and Figure 2(a2). When 
steam generator empties (see on Figure 2(b1) and Figure 2(b2)), the RCS starts to heat what 
resulted in the pressure increase and additional RCS inventory loss due to pressurizer safety valves 
opening. Even if SG injection started before the steam generators are emptied as shown on Figure 
2(b1) and Figure 2(b2), continuous RCS mass loss due to RCP seal leakages and unisolated letdown 
line loss resulted in the core uncovery in approximately 12 h (in case of significant accumulator 
injection this time may be prolonged for some hour - see scenario SL_LOSS_3 (C1)). 
The core heatup, as shown in Table 2, is obtained also for other type scenarios when pump 
operation is delayed for extended period. Figure 3 shows that the core uncovery is not prevented for 
C1 scenarios with delay 5 hours and for C2 scenarios with delay 3 hours. With no heat sink for the 
core decay heat due to steam generator boil-off, the RCS starts to heat up and the primary pressure 
increases until pressurizer safety valves open. This resulted in RCS mass discharge and core 
uncovery with heatup. As can be seen from Figure 3, the EDG operating one hour delays core 
uncovery for additional two hours. This demonstrated that operation of safety systems in the initial 
hour besides cooling the core gives additional time to operators and requires smaller injection flows 
(smaller demand for pump flow capacity). In the worst case scenario, with SBO occurring at full 
power, the core starts to uncover after 2 h in case no injection to steam generators is available. This 
means little available time to the operators, especially to use the portable pump. 
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Figure 2 Comparison of C1 and C2 Cases for SL_LOSS Type Base Calculations with Different SG 
Injection Delays: (a) Core collapsed liquid level, (b) SG. no. 2 WR level. 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of Base Calculations for C1 (5 h Injection Delay) and C2 (3 h Injection 
Delay): (a) Core collapsed liquid level, (b) SG. no. 2 WR level. 
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3.2 Verification Calculations 
The third step in the methodology presented in Section 2.2 is to verify the calculated 
minimum necessary pump flowrates given in Table 2. The verification calculations are performed 
for all scenarios listed in Table 2 in which core heat up is prevented. The results are shown in 
Figures 4 through 7 for RCS pressure, core collapsed liquid level, SG no. 1 and SG no. 2 wide 
range level, respectively. The results are shown for the 72 h except for RCS pressure the 24 h 
interval is used as the initial hours are the most important from the point of RCS discharge through 
safety valves. Later (after one day) the RCS pressure start to follow the secondary pressure or it is 
on this trend. Each of Figures 4 through 7 show five scenario types with different assumed injection 
delays (all types except SL_LOSS) for both cases (C1 and C2). 
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Figure 4 shows that it takes the longest time for NO_LOSS type scenarios that the RCS 
pressure drops below the safety valve setpoint (see Figures 4(a1) and (a2)). In all other type 
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scenarios the one or more RCS losses are present (see Section 2.3) resulting in faster initial RCS 
pressure decrease. If secondary side cooling is not available, the RCS may repressurize until the 
injection into SGs starts. As normal RCS loss is smaller than RCS loss through RCPs, the pressure 
decrease is slower in N_LOSS type scenarios than in the S_LOSS type scenarios. However, if 
depressurization is performed, there is no qualitative difference between SLD_LOSS and 
NSLD_LOSS type scenarios. 
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Figure 5 shows that the core in the first 24 h is not significantly uncovered except for 
SLD_LOSS_2 and NSLD_LOSS_2 scenarios. The reason is too small flowrate in the beginning of 
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transient comparing to base calculations in which according to assumption the SG level was 
automatically maintained. When the first time interval was divided in two sub-intervals, i.e. 
assuming the constant flow of 10 kg/s (verification calculations SLD_LOSS_2f1 (C2) and 
NSLD_LOSS-2f1 (C2)) in the first four hours and 5.77 kg/s in the remaining 18 hours instead of 
6.54 kg/s until 24 h, core uncovery was prevented as shown in Figures 5(b4) and 5(b5). However, 
when larger RCS loss is present (S_LOCA type scenarios, Case 2), after one day the core may start 
to uncover, even if there is sufficient water inventory in the steam generators. This time may be 
prolonged, if injection to SGs is started very early (in the first hour after SBO occurrence). On the 
other hand, if EDG is running one hour after LOOP with reactor trip (Case 1), the decay heat level 
is lower than after reactor trip and therefore the calculations showed that the core remains 
uncovered if injection into SGs starts in 3 h. Nevertheless, when the reactor is depressurized the 
core uncovery is prevented for assumed RCP seal loss and maximum normal RCS loss in the first 
72 h with proposed flow injection to the steam generators. 
Finally, Figures 6 and 7 show steam generator wide range levels for steam generator no. 1 and 
2, respectively. It is clearly demonstrated the efficiency of the method for necessary flow 
determination and at the same time not to overfill or empty steam generators. It can be seen that 
steam generator levels in all shown scenarios are well maintained. As one pump is feeding both 
steam generators, in certain scenarios (e.g. SLD_LOSS_3 (C1)) the SG level oscillates. It should be 
noted, when level in one steam generator increases, in the other decreases, and vice versa. The small 
oscillations present in the SG level trends are due to SG relief valves discharge at the discrete 
periods. Nevertheless, later the filling of both steam generators is smooth and similar for both steam 
generators. 
The assessed flowrates from the TD-AFW cumulative injected mass in the base calculations 
of analysed case scenarios minimize the required number of flow changes and potential operator’s 
errors during required manipulations. The assessed flow for steam generator makeup assures 
effective core cooling without overfilling the steam generators.  
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Figure 4: Dependence of RCS Pressure on Injection Time Delays during Different Scenario Types 
for: (a) C1 – SBO Start 1 h after LOOP, (b) C2 – SBO Concurrent with LOOP. 
A. Prošek, RELAP5/MOD3.3 Analyses of Core Heatup Prevention Strategy during Extended Station Blackout in PWR, Journal of Energy, vol. 65-2 





Figure 5: Dependence of Core Collapsed Liquid Level on Injection Time Delays during Different 
Scenario Types: (a) C1 – SBO Start 1 h after LOOP, (b) C2 – SBO Concurrent with LOOP. 
A. Prošek, RELAP5/MOD3.3 Analyses of Core Heatup Prevention Strategy during Extended Station Blackout in PWR, Journal of Energy, vol. 65-2 





Figure 6: Dependence of SG No. 1 WR Level on Injection Time Delays during Different Scenario 
Types: (a) C1 – SBO Start 1 h after LOOP, (b) C2 – SBO Concurrent with LOOP. 
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Figure 7: Dependence of SG No. 2 WR Level on Injection Time Delays during Different Scenario 
Types: (a) C1 – SBO Start 1 h after LOOP, (b) C2 – SBO Concurrent with LOOP. 
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To support the FLEX implementation to prevent damage to the fuel in the reactor the 
RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch04 thermal-hydraulic system code has been used to study the utilization of 
pump for mitigation of the extended blackout condition. The method for the assessment of the 
necessary injection flowrate for steam generators makeup for mitigation of extended blackout event 
has been proposed.  
Six different scenarios of reactor coolant loss have been developed and analysed. Two cases 
have been defined considering the operation of the emergency diesel generators. Different delays of 
the pump injection (into steam generators) start following the station blackout have been assumed 
and analysed. 
Obtained results show that typical pressurized water reactor with the leak tight reactor coolant 
pump seals with small seal loss or depressurization of the reactor coolant system can cope the first 
72 hours of extended SBO if pump is available to start inject into secondary side within two hours 
of the SBO start. Operation of the emergency diesel generator for one hour extends the available 
time for the start of pump on four hours. Failure to isolate the letdown results in the core damage 
before 24 h in all analysed scenarios. 
The effective mitigation strategy for the extended blackout condition can be developed with 
the utilization of the presented method. The method can be modified for different type of pumps 
and their characteristics. One of the main conclusions in the study is that availability of equipment 
is prerequisite but not guarantee of successful mitigation. Namely, the verification analyses suggest 
that the time available requires quick response of operators in case of using portable equipment. On 
the other hand, base calculations show that there may be some delay in TD-AFW pump start and 
that it is urgent to isolate letdown line in order to prevent core heatup, when no RCS injection is 
available. 
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